Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 soldiers to the Gaza Strip as part of an international stabilization or peacekeeping force linked to the second phase of a ceasefire plan brokered by the United States.
According to the BBC, the troops would be part of “phase two” of a ceasefire accord intended to consolidate calm in Gaza and support post-war governance and reconstruction. General Maruli Simanjuntak, Indonesia’s army chief of staff, has said preparations for the deployment have begun, with a focus on medical and engineering roles rather than combat operations.
As reported by ABC News Australia, an Indonesian presidential spokesperson confirmed that Jakarta is readying up to 8,000 soldiers for a multinational force mandated to help secure Gaza’s borders and support demilitarization measures under the ceasefire framework. The Jewish Chronicle and other outlets have noted that Indonesia is expected to be the first country to move from general political backing to concrete readiness to send troops for this mission.
Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim‑majority nation, has long been a vocal supporter of the Palestinian cause and has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel. The prospective deployment aligns with Jakarta’s efforts since late 2023 to couple humanitarian support for Gaza with a larger diplomatic profile in Middle East crisis management.
President Prabowo Subianto has repeatedly signaled that Indonesia is willing to contribute significantly to international security operations in Gaza. According to reports citing his address at the United Nations General Assembly in 2025, Prabowo stated that Indonesia could deploy “20,000 or even more” troops to support peace in conflict zones such as Gaza.
How Is the Mission Being Framed Internationally?
Indonesia’s possible deployment is tied to an internationally backed ceasefire scheme that envisages a staged end to large‑scale hostilities, a withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the creation of an International Stabilization Force in Gaza. According to the Jerusalem Post and other regional outlets, this force would be tasked with peacekeeping duties and securing key areas, particularly border zones, rather than carrying out offensive operations against Hamas.
Channel 11 in Israel, cited by the Jerusalem Post, has reported that neither the International Stabilization Force in general nor Indonesian units in particular are expected to directly confront Hamas or actively disarm the group. Instead, their presence would be intended to support conditions for demilitarization and a phased Israeli withdrawal under the broader ceasefire roadmap.
Indonesia’s readiness has been highlighted in contrast to other states that have expressed political support for stabilization but have not yet advanced to concrete troop commitments. Media reports list possible additional contributors under discussion, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Italy, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey, but Indonesia remains the most advanced in operational planning.
As reported by The New Arab and Middle East Eye, Jakarta has repeatedly stressed that any involvement in Gaza should be consistent with international law, the protection of civilians, and long‑standing calls for a viable Palestinian state. Indonesian officials have framed the prospective deployment as part of a wider humanitarian and diplomatic engagement rather than a purely military intervention.
Public sentiment in Indonesia has also shaped the context for these decisions. According to Middle East Eye, thousands of Indonesians participated in demonstrations in 2025 calling for justice for Palestinians and criticizing policies seen as inconsistent with sympathy for Gaza, including educational exchanges with Israeli institutions.
Supporting Details: Indonesia’s Wider Role and Capabilities
Beyond the troop plan, Indonesia has provided humanitarian support to Gaza since the escalation of the war in October 2023. According to The New Arab, Jakarta has offered medical treatment for thousands of injured Palestinians at a converted facility on Galang Island and conducted multiple airdrops of humanitarian aid into the enclave.
Middle East Eye reports that Indonesia delivered 10,000 tonnes of rice to Palestinians in August 2025 and launched long‑term cultivation projects in Sumatra and Kalimantan aimed at bolstering Palestinian food security. These initiatives are presented by Indonesian officials as part of a sustained commitment to Palestinian welfare that extends beyond immediate emergency relief.
Indonesia’s military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), has extensive experience in United Nations peacekeeping operations, including missions in Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other conflict zones. Outlets covering the Gaza planning note that the proposed deployment would draw heavily on engineering and medical units, leveraging this peacekeeping background for tasks such as infrastructure repair, de‑mining support, and civilian protection.
As reported by i24News and other broadcasters, the Indonesian army chief of staff has emphasized that final troop numbers, rules of engagement, and deployment timelines remain subject to coordination with national authorities and the international command structure overseeing the stabilization force. This indicates that, while political approval has been signaled in principle, operational details are still under negotiation.
Indonesia’s proactive stance is also tied to President Prabowo’s broader foreign‑policy agenda, which seeks to position the country as a more influential actor in global security, especially in crises affecting Muslim populations. His participation in summits on Gaza with leaders including US President Donald Trump and Egypt’s President Abdel‑Fattah el‑Sisi has reinforced Jakarta’s aspiration to help shape the post‑conflict order in the territory.
What Is China Saying About a Ceasefire?
China’s position has intersected with Indonesia’s activism through shared calls for an effective and lasting ceasefire in Gaza. As reported by Asharq Al‑Awsat, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi jointly called for an “immediate and lasting cease-fire” after talks in Jakarta in April 2024.
According to Asharq Al‑Awsat’s account of those talks, Marsudi said that Indonesia and China held the same view on the urgency of a ceasefire and on resolving the conflict through a two‑state solution. She added that both countries would “fully support Palestine’s membership in the UN,” underscoring support for greater Palestinian international recognition.
Wang Yi used the visit to criticize what he described as obstacles to ceasefire resolutions at the United Nations, pointing in particular to the role of the United States in Security Council deliberations. Chinese officials have consistently linked their calls for a ceasefire to condemnation of civilian casualties in Gaza and to appeals for greater humanitarian access.
Beijing has also signaled its willingness to use its diplomatic influence, including its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, to press for de‑escalation. In public statements, Chinese officials have framed their engagement as part of a broader push to promote multilateral conflict resolution and support for the Palestinian people.
Indonesian and Chinese positions on Gaza have converged around several core themes: an immediate ceasefire, humanitarian relief, a long‑term political solution based on a two‑state framework, and increased recognition for Palestine in international institutions. This convergence has been highlighted in coverage of Wang Yi’s 2024 tour, which included visits to Papua New Guinea and Cambodia as well as Indonesia.
What Are the Implications and Possible Next Steps?
The preparation of up to 8,000 Indonesian troops for a Gaza mission signals one of the clearest commitments yet by a single country to staff an international stabilization force tied to a ceasefire arrangement. If deployed, these forces would likely become central to efforts to secure border areas, support demilitarization commitments, and enable the withdrawal of Israeli forces under the phased plan.
According to BBC reporting, the force’s emphasis on medical and engineering units suggests a strong focus on reconstruction and civilian protection, rather than combat operations. This profile could help address urgent needs such as repairing critical infrastructure, supporting hospitals, and clearing unexploded ordnance in heavily damaged areas.
Diplomatically, Indonesia’s move may encourage other states to translate political support for Gaza’s stabilization into concrete troop or financial contributions, especially if the ceasefire holds and a clear international mandate remains in place. The list of potential contributors mentioned in regional media shows that several governments are under consideration, although none has publicly matched Indonesia’s current level of readiness.
China’s call for an effective and durable ceasefire, articulated alongside Indonesia, could add weight to international efforts at the United Nations to lock in broader political support for a transition in Gaza. Beijing’s backing for a two‑state solution and Palestinian UN membership aligns with Indonesian diplomacy and may shape debates over the long‑term status of the territory once immediate security arrangements are in place.
Future developments will depend on several variables: the implementation of the phased ceasefire plan, the formation and mandate of the international stabilization force, and the emergence of a post‑war governance structure in Gaza. Indonesian officials have indicated that detailed timelines and operational parameters for troop deployment will be finalized in coordination with domestic authorities, international partners, and the relevant UN or multinational frameworks overseeing the mission.
Indonesia’s preparations to send thousands of troops to Gaza, combined with China’s calls for an immediate and lasting ceasefire, reflect a growing role for Asian powers in efforts to stabilize the territory and support Palestinians after years of conflict. While many elements of the ceasefire and deployment plan remain contingent on political and security developments, Jakarta’s readiness and Beijing’s diplomatic backing have emerged as significant features of the evolving international response to the war in Gaza.
